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Airborne Argus?: St. Louis, Persistent Surveillance Systems, and 




On October 10, 2019, St. Louis Mayor Lyda Krewson met Ross McNutt, 
President of Persistent Surveillance Systems (“PSS”), to discuss a three-year 
trial of his product.1 A contemporaneous protest amassed before City Hall.2 
McNutt’s three-plane, 36-camera system monitors thirty square miles from 
10,000 feet, taking one photograph a second.3 When a crime occurs, the 
operator zooms in on the area, targets a suspect, and zooms out, 
backtracking the photo-log to follow the pixelized perp.4 The system can 
also be used as a live feed.5 
PSS was implemented in Baltimore without residents’ knowledge from 
2016 to 2019.6 Even so, residents chose to reimplement beginning May, 
2020.7 Residents of Dayton, Ohio, strongly opposed implementation.8 
System opponents fear PSS is too expensive and would target minority 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, Saint Louis University School of Law 
1 Vic Faust, Protests Over St. Louis City’s Proposes Use of Surveillance Planes, FOX 2 ST. LOUIS, 
(Oct. 10, 2019) https://fox2now.com/2019/10/10/protests-over-st-louis-citys-proposed-use-
of-surveillance-planes/. 
2 Id. 
3 Beth Shane, Note, After “Knowing Exposure”: First and Fourth Amendment Dimensions of 
Drone Regulation, 73 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 323, 324 (2018); Jake Laperruque, Data 
Collection and Advancements in Surveillance Techniques: Preventing an Air Panopticon: A 
Proposal for Reasonable Legal Restrictions on Aerial Surveillance, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 705, 707 
(2017); Nightly News (NBC television broadcast Feb. 9, 2019). 
4 Benjamin White, Article, Clipped Wings: Domestic Drone Surveillance and the Limits of Due 
Process Protection, 86 U. CIN. L. REV. 357, 384 (2018). 
5 Id. 
6 Kevin Rector, Over 70% of Baltimore Residents Would Support Controversial 
Surveillance Plane, Poll Shows. The Baltimore Sun (Oct 14, 2019), 
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-ci-cr-poll-on-planes-20191014-
mmot33qvm5f7pdwznim3qrx4oq-story.html. 
7 Nightly News (NBC television broadcast Feb. 9, 2019). 
8 Rector, supra note 6; White, supra note 4. 
 




populations and innocent bystanders.9 McNutt claims picture quality is too 
low for targeting based on race and gender.10 
Community activist, Cedric Redmon, sees the program as a necessity, 
providing security in under-policed neighborhoods.11 He posits privacy in 
location information is far from reasonable, citing social media location 
data.12 
Enforcing the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures” requires 
definition of “unreasonable.”13 
The traditional “reasonableness” test–trespass doctrine–focuses on 
property and protected areas. Searches are unreasonable when “persons, 
houses, papers, and effects” are trespassed upon warrantlessly to obtain 
information.14 
Protection of “houses” extends to a “curtilage,” where “intimate activities 
of the home” occur.15 A tiny fraction of airspace above the home is 
protected, but most is public, “navigable airspace”16 
The protective efficiency of trespass doctrine has waned as technology 
advances, leading the Court to develop “expectation of privacy” 
jurisprudence.17 
 
9 KMOV.com Staff, Protesters Raise Privacy Concerns Over Proposed Aerial Surveillance 
Concerns, KMOV 4, (Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.kmov.com/news/protesters-raise-
privacy-concerns-over-proposed-aerial-surveillance-concerns/article_3ab5e828-eba5-
11e9-a90b-9be1918fdb43.html. 
10 Mark Schlinkmann, St. Louis Considers Plan for Daily Aerial Surveillance. St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch (Oct. 3, 2019), https://www.govtech.com/public-safety/St-Louis-Mo-
Considers-Plan-for-Daily-Aerial-Surveillance.html. 
11 Id. 
12 KMOV.com Staff, supra note 9. 
13 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
14 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-05 (2012). 
15 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 302 (1987). 
16 United States v. Causby, 328, U.S. 256, 246 (1946). 
17 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that prior 
precedent’s limitation of the Fourth Amendment to trespass was “in the present day, bad 
physics as well as bad law.”). 
 




Modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence begins with Katz, which 
rebuked trespass doctrine, concentrating on expectation of privacy. 18 
Justice Harlan concurred, applying the now famous two-prong test: (1) a 
personal, subjective expectation, and (2) society’s acceptance of the 
expectation as reasonable.19 Katz is used to keep up with technology, 
sometimes to confounding result. 
In Knotts, the Court held movement on public roadways “voluntarily 
convey[s]” details about where a person is and where he is going.20 
Surveillance of the home and curtilage from public roads, unassisted by 
certain technologies, is also reasonable.21 
Public airspace provides another point of surveillance. In 1986, the Court 
upheld naked-eye observation of a fenced-in back yard from 1,000 feet.22 
Justice Powell applied Katz, but dissented, proving the Katz test can lead to 
disparate results.23 
Surveillance duration is also important. In Jones, the Court held collection 
of location information on public roadways for twenty-eight consecutive 
days was unconstitutional.24 The Sotomayor and Alito concurrences rely on 
“mosaic theory,” which recognizes aggregation of public activity can create 
an intimate picture of a person’s life contrary to privacy interests.25 
Mosaic theory is adopted by the majority in Carpenter, which concerns cell 
site location information (CSLI).26 CSLI reports a time-stamped location27, 
in this case, 101 times a day.28 Such information would have been 
impossible before the “digital age” meaning society’s expectation is that it 
 
18 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348, 353, 355. 
19 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
20 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983) (officers used a “beeper” in a drum 
picked up by a suspect to follow him to his home, even when they lost visual contact). 
21 Id. at 283. 
22 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209, 215 (1986). 
23 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
24 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012). 
25 Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring). 
26 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018). 
27 Id. at 2218. 
28 Id. at 2212. 
 




is unobtainable.29 The Court suggests cell phones are usually in the same 
location as the owner and, when tracked retrospectively, paint an intimate 
picture of the owner’s life. 30 Seven days of this information constitutes a 
search.31 
Kennedy dissented. Applying Katz, he claims location sharing through 
social media decreases both subjective and objective expectations of 
privacy.32 He calls the seven-day threshold arbitrary33 and argues because 
CSLI is not as precise and GPS data in Jones mosaic theory does not apply.34 
Gorsuch and Thomas directly attack Katz, using trespass theory to find 
against Carpenter.35  
Kennedy gives credence to Redmon’s social media theory, and wide-spread 
support for PSS in Baltimore suggests objective, societal approval.36 If PSS 
data belongs to the city, this simple Katz analysis may suffice: PSS tech is 
used to monitor public movement or movement observable from public 
spaces, and is compatible with reasonableness analysis in Katz and Ciraolo. 
Carpenter’s Mosaic theory appears anti-PSS. CSLI provided 101 daily 
location points. PSS would provide up to 57,600. This location data would 
be pinpoint accurate, not just within a few square miles (Carpenter) or a few 
feet (Jones). 
The constitutional outcome is unclear and legislative action is necessary to 
avoid a Fourth Amendment kerfuffle. 
 
29 Id. 
30 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014). 
31 Id. at n. 3. 
32 Id. at 2232 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
33 Id. at 2233. Kennedy is not only perturbed by the implication that fewer days’ worth of 
surveillance might not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. See also Id. at 2266-67 
(Gorsuch, J. dissenting) (officers in Carpenter only had access to two of the requested 
seven days’ worth of records, so the seven day time frame seems not only arbitrary, but 
factually false). 
34 Id. at 2225. 
35 Id. at 2238 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas goes so far as to say Harlan coined the 
phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the opinion.; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2263 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
36 Rector, supra note 6 (70% of polled Baltimore residents supported reimplementation 
after the 2016-2019 surveillance period). 
 




Since 2017, City aldermen have proposed an ordinance requiring 
surveillance programs to submit a prospectus on use and types of evidence 
collected.37 Such a law could entice PSS administrators to employ additional 
safeguards. 
Scholars have suggested a “naked-eye rule” limiting data collection by PSS-
style systems to details observable in Ciraolo.38 Codifying this rule limits 
PSS’s use of better cameras or lower-altitude flights. 
Legislation might require electronic location information of a certain age 
(e.g., ten minutes) be deleted unless a red-flag event triggers retention.39 
Limiting red-flag events provides meaningful protection but limits the cost-
effectiveness of continuous flight. 
A more complicated, graduated system would permit collection and 
impose limits to accessibility.40 Perhaps incorporate Carpenter, by allowing 
warrantless search two consecutive days of location information, requiring 
reasonable suspicion up to six days, and a warrant thereafter. 
New positive law is necessary to overcome PSS-related Fourth Amendment 
questions. Employing these solutions, St. Louisans must decide whether 
Persistent Surveillance strengthens or smothers their community. 
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37 BB. 66, Session 2017-2018 (First Reading Jun. 16, 2017); BB. 219, Session 2018-2019 (First 
Reading Jan. 11, 2019); BB. 94, Session 2019-2020 (First Reading, Jul. 12, 2019). 
38 Jake Laperruque, Data Collection and Advancements in Surveillance Techniques: Preventing 
an Air Panopticon: A Proposal for Reasonable Legal Restrictions on Aerial Surveillance, 51 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 705, 724 (2017) 
39 Id. 
40 Professor McNeil suggests a scheme in which (1) aerial surveillance of a person may 
continue for sixty minutes in any seven-day period at the officer’s discretion (2) aerial 
surveillance extending for sixty minutes to forty-eight hours in any seven-day period 
may only take place with a court order and reasonable suspicion, and (3) aerial 
surveillance of longer than forty-eight hours in any seven-day period is permissible only 
when accompanied by a warrant and probable cause. McNeil, supra note 108, at 407. 
